The United States’ decision to classify Brazil’s two largest criminal factions as terrorist groups has opened a dispute over sovereignty, law enforcement and financial risk, while exposing a deeper question inside Brazil: whether the state has already lost too much ground to organizations born in its own prison system.
The U.S. State Department said on May 28 that Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and Comando Vermelho (CV) would be treated as Specially Designated Global Terrorists, with classification as Foreign Terrorist Organizations set to begin on June 5, according to Consultor Jurídico. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio called them two of Brazil’s most violent criminal organizations and said their networks extend beyond Brazil.
A Sovereignty Argument
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s government rejected the move as a risk to Brazilian sovereignty and the economy. In a statement cited by Consultor Jurídico, the government said the factions cause terror in communities but act mainly for profit through drug and arms trafficking, not for ideological, political or religious goals normally associated with international terrorism.
The Lula administration said Brazil has been fighting factions and militias through measures including the 2026 Anti-Faction Law and the Brasil Contra o Crime Organizado program. It also said Brazil had proposed expanded cooperation with Washington on money laundering abroad and arms trafficking into Brazil.
But Christian Vianna, a former Federal Police agent and terrorism researcher, told Folha de S.Paulo that the greater sovereignty threat may already be domestic. “When PCC and CV conquer territories where the state does not enter, they usurp the country’s sovereignty,” he said. In his view, the gangs threaten Brazilian sovereignty more than the United States does.
Vianna, now Minas Gerais state’s undersecretary for public security integration, called Washington’s decision political but potentially useful. He said the main benefit would be stronger international cooperation and financial pressure against groups that launder money abroad and operate across borders.
The Legal Divide
The disagreement is partly conceptual. Brazilian law has traditionally separated terrorism from organized crime, while U.S. law uses a broader definition that can include groups that spread fear for economic ends.
Brazil’s Law 15,358, enacted on March 24, created a legal framework for “ultraviolent criminal organizations,” paramilitary groups and private militias. It defined crimes such as structured social control, intimidation of communities or public agents, attacks on public services and obstruction of police operations, with prison terms that can reach 40 years.
The law also permits integrated task forces, international police or intelligence cooperation in transnational cases, asset freezes, restrictions on financial systems including Pix, and a national database on ultraviolent organizations. It does not require treating such groups as terrorist organizations.
Legal specialists cited by Consultor Jurídico said the terrorist label would bring little practical gain to Brazilian investigations, because tools already exist under organized-crime, money-laundering and anti-terrorism statutes. Some warned it could create an “exception” logic that weakens rights and due process.
Money, Territory and Coordination
The financial dimension may be where the U.S. designation matters most. Vianna told Folha that PCC already has its own fintechs and international financial structure, and that U.S. administrative asset-freezing powers could reach dollar transactions by people or companies linked to the factions. He also warned that banks and companies may face new exposure if they were used unknowingly in laundering schemes.
The Brazilian government said unilateral measures could harm information-sharing between police forces and affect the financial system and national payment tools such as Pix. Vianna considered direct U.S. military action in Brazil highly unlikely, saying cooperation with the FBI has occurred before, including in Operation Trapiche, a 2023 Federal Police probe opened after an FBI alert about suspected Hezbollah-linked terrorist planning in Brazil.
A second critique, raised by Folha do Estado SC, is internal: Brazil’s fragmented federal security model allowed state-level prison gangs to become national and transnational actors. PCC emerged in São Paulo’s prison system in the 1990s, while CV consolidated from Rio de Janeiro’s penitentiary system. Both expanded while police, prosecutors, tax authorities, intelligence agencies, prisons and financial regulators often worked through separate state and federal structures.
Vianna made the same point in institutional terms. Brazil, he said, still lacks uniform national mechanisms for investigation, repression and intelligence-sharing. For him, defeating PCC and CV is not a matter of one law or one foreign designation, but a long-term state project involving police, prosecutors, courts, tax authorities, financial regulators, prisons, public services and society itself.