The United States’ decision to classify Brazil’s two best-known criminal factions as terrorist organizations has opened a new risk front for Brazilian companies, especially those tied to finance, fuel, logistics and agribusiness.
The U.S. State Department announced on May 28 that Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), a prison-born criminal network based in São Paulo, and Comando Vermelho (CV), a Rio de Janeiro faction, would be designated as Specially Designated Global Terrorists and, from June 5, as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said the groups were among Brazil’s most violent criminal organizations.
What Changes
The measure does not automatically ban Brazilian agricultural products or other exports. Its immediate effect is to prohibit U.S. persons and companies from doing business with individuals, firms or structures linked to the two factions. Assets under U.S. jurisdiction may also be frozen.
The wider concern is secondary exposure. Brazilian companies that are not based in the United States could still face problems if they are added to sanctions lists, use dollar-based transactions, depend on correspondent banks, or maintain contracts with buyers and insurers subject to U.S. rules.
That risk matters because Brazilian investigators and analysts say criminal groups have moved into parts of the formal economy. Poder360 cited concern over suppliers of farm inputs, fuel distributors, transport companies, warehouses and financing channels. G1 reported that researchers and investigators see money laundering through Brazil’s financial system as the main reason the designation could have economic consequences.
Agribusiness Exposure
Agribusiness is one of the sectors most exposed to indirect risk. Its supply chains rely on fuel, trucking, port logistics, rural credit and chemical inputs — all areas where prosecutors or police have raised concerns about criminal infiltration.
According to Poder360, data from Brazil’s Federal Revenue Service and the Federal Highway Police cited by Jota indicated that counterfeit and smuggled pesticides may account for up to one-fifth of the Brazilian crop-protection market. Federal highway seizures of irregular pesticides rose from 62.9 metric tons in 2024 to 127 metric tons in 2025, while Federal Revenue seizures grew 55% between 2020 and 2025, reaching R$16.4 million.
Poder360 also cited Operation Iceberg, a 2025 Federal Police case involving alleged use of apparently legitimate logistics companies to move drugs along routes also used for agricultural commodities. The source does not say legitimate agribusiness companies were complicit, but it points to the risk that contaminated providers can enter otherwise lawful supply chains.
Banks and Politics
G1 highlighted Operation Carbono Oculto, a Federal Police investigation into alleged PCC infiltration in financial markets and the formal economy. Prosecutor Lincoln Gakiya said the case showed how fuel-sector transactions, fintechs and investment structures could mix criminal and lawful money before reaching larger financial institutions.
Thiago Rodrigues, a professor of international relations at the Federal Fluminense University and a researcher at the Brazilian Forum on Public Security, told G1 that the Foreign Terrorist Organization label gives the United States broader ability to pursue people or companies in third countries that have relations with listed groups. A representative of a large Brazilian bank, speaking confidentially to G1, minimized the risk for major banks and said fintechs with weaker compliance systems were more likely to be affected.
The decision also has a political dimension. BBC Brasil reported that international outlets, including The New York Times and the Financial Times, linked the timing to meetings in Washington involving Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, a son of former president Jair Bolsonaro and a presidential hopeful. The Lula government had resisted the designation, arguing that the factions do not pursue ideological goals and warning that the move could create sovereignty and cooperation risks.
For companies, the practical effect is likely to be stricter due diligence. Banks, insurers, traders, exporters and buyers may demand clearer proof that suppliers, transporters, fuel providers and financial intermediaries are not tied to sanctioned networks. Even without a formal sanction, association risk can be enough to raise costs, delay transactions or trigger contract reviews.